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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JARRETT ALEXANDER,
  Plaintiff, 
v.
METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOSINC.; WARNER BROTHERSENTERTAINMENT, INC.; NEWLINE CINEMA CORPORATION;CHARTOFF-WINKLERPRODUCTIONS, INC.;SYLVESTER STALLONE; RYANCOOGLER; AARON COVINGTON,
  Defendants.
)))))))))))))))))))
CV 17-3123-RSWL-KSx
ORDER re: Defendants’Motion to DismissPlaintiff’s Complaint inits Entirety withPrejudice [52]
Currently before the Court is Defendants Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. (“MGM”), Warner Brothers
Entertainment, Inc. (“Warner Brothers”), New Line
Cinema Corporation (“New Line”), Chartoff-Winkler
Productions Inc. (“CWP”), Sylvester Stallone
(“Stallone”), Ryan Coogler (“Coogler”), and Aaron
Covington’s (“Covington”) (collectively, “Defendants”)
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Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Jarrett Alexander’s
(“Plaintiff”) Complaint in its Entirety with Prejudice
[52] (“Motion” or “Motion to Dismiss”).  Having
reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to this
Motion, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the
Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss WITHOUT
LEAVE TO AMEND [52].
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
This is an Action common to this district, where a
plaintiff claims that defendants, typically
entertainment industry corporations or executives,
stole his idea for a popular television show or motion
picture.
Plaintiff is a New Jersey citizen and a largely
unknown television and movie actor.  Compl. ¶¶ 6, 17,
ECF No. 1-1.  MGM, Warner Brothers, New Line, and CWP
are Delaware corporations, a Delaware LLC, and a
California corporation, respectively.1  Decl. of Sandy
Murray (“Murray Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 1-3; Smith Decl. ¶
3; Compl. ¶ 10.  All have their principal place of
business throughout the greater Los Angeles area. 
Compl. ¶¶ 7-10.  Defendants Stallone, Coogler, and
Covington are California citizens.  Id. at ¶¶ 11-13. 
Rocky is an internationally-known movie released in
1 New Line was incorrectly named New Line Cinema Corporation
in the Complaint [1].  New Line was converted to an LLC on
December 31, 2009.  Decl. of Wayne M. Smith (“Smith Decl.”) ¶ 1,
ECF No. 1-4.
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1976.  Id. at ¶ 20.  Stallone starred as the titular
character, Rocky Balboa, a professional boxer.  Apollo
Creed is another character featured in four of the
Rocky franchise sequels.  Id. at ¶¶ 23-24.
In 2008, Plaintiff, a lifelong fan of the Rocky
franchise, allegedly came up with an idea to create a
story about the fighting career of Apollo Creed’s son. 
Id. at ¶ 2.  The story would emphasize the theme of
building one’s own legacy.  Id. at ¶¶ 2, 18, 25.  He
drafted a screenplay, initially titled “Creed: Rocky
Legacy,” later titled “Creed” (the “Screenplay”).  Id.
at ¶ 26.  The Screenplay follows Apollo Creed’s son as
he establishes himself in the boxing community, copes
with his father’s death, and builds his own legacy with
Rocky Balboa’s advice and mentorship.  Id. at ¶ 27.2 
Plaintiff also made a “pitch reel,” a short
promotional film about the Screenplay and its “legacy”
theme (the “Pitch Reel”).  Id. at ¶ 33.  The Pitch Reel
starts with a reporter interviewing Apollo Creed’s son
and asking him whether he will uphold his father’s
legacy.  Id. at ¶ 35.  Plaintiff posted the Pitch Reel
on Vimeo, a social networking platform for sharing
video content.  Id. at ¶ 41.  In 2012, he created a
website, www.creedmovie.com (the “Website”), which was
2 In 2010, Plaintiff registered the Screenplay, titled
“Creed: Rocky Legacy” with the Writer’s Guild of America (“WGA”),
registration number VPFA4D8DCEF2.  Id. at ¶ 28.  Thereafter, he
registered the Screenplay, this time entitled “Creed,” with the
United States Copyright Office, registration number PA0001861140. 
Id. at ¶ 30.
3
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later transferred to a different domain,
www.jarrettalexander.com, after the original domain
lapsed in June 2014.  Id. at ¶ 39.  The Website
contained the Pitch Reel and described how Plaintiff
developed the Screenplay.  Id. at ¶ 40.  The
Screenplay, Pitch Reel, and Website are collectively
referred to as the “Creed Idea.”
Between 2010 and 2013, Plaintiff attempted to
generate interest in the Creed Idea.  In 2010, he
circulated the Screenplay to individuals in the movie
industry.  Id. at ¶ 36.  He alleges that Coogler knows
and interacts with some of these individuals; for
example, Coogler and one of the Screenplay recipients
both attended the American Black Film Festival in
Miami, Florida in July 2011.  Id. at ¶ 38.
Because Plaintiff lacked the financial means or
connections to make a movie on his own, he also took to
social media to pitch the Creed Idea to movie industry
insiders.  Id. at ¶ 51.  In April 2012, Plaintiff and
several friends started promoting the Creed Idea on
Twitter, a social media platform where individuals can
post or “tweet” short, public messages that can be
directed at specific users.  Id. at ¶ 42.  They tweeted
links to the Website and the Pitch Reel to several
individuals in the movie and professional fighting
industries.  Id. at ¶ 43.  
For instance, they tweeted at actor and ex-
professional wrestler, Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson,
4
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Stallone, and Carl Weathers (the actor who played
Apollo Creed in the Rocky movies), attaching a link to
the Website.  Id. at ¶¶ 44-47.  Stallone, MGM, and New
Line all allegedly “follow” Dwayne Johnson’s twitter
account and Plaintiff alleges that Stallone and Dwayne
Johnson are friends.  Id. at ¶ 45.  Plaintiff’s friend
also tweeted Stallone directly: “@TheSlyStallone next
rocky installment4u? 2min trailer. Wants to meet u
creedmovie.com.”  Id. at ¶ 46.  Between April 2012 and
July 2013, Plaintiff and his friends allegedly sent
more than 25 tweets that hyperlinked to the Website and
encouraged Stallone to work with Plaintiff on the Creed
Idea.  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants reviewed the
Screenplay, Website, and Pitch Reel.  Id. at ¶ 50. 
On July 24, 2013, MGM and Stallone announced their
plans to develop Creed, a motion picture about Apollo
Creed’s son.  Id. at ¶ 56.  They recruited Coogler to
write the screenplay.  Id.  Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants’ movie, Creed, is premised exactly on the
Creed Idea he created.  Id. at ¶ 69.  Specifically,
Defendants’ Creed follows Apollo Creed’s son as he
strives to create his own legacy under the tutelage of
the now-retired fighter, Rocky Balboa.  Id. at ¶ 70. 
And the official Creed trailer features the following
phrase: “Your Legacy is More Than a Name.”  Id. at ¶
72.  Alleging that Defendants stole his idea, Plaintiff
filed the instant Action. 
///
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B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed the Complaint on February 26, 2016
in New Jersey state court, asserting claims for (1)
misappropriation of an idea; (2) breach of implied
contract; and (3) unjust enrichment [1-1].  Defendants
removed the action to the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey (“New Jersey Court”) on
April 14, 2016.
On April 22, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with Prejudice [6] and a
Motion to Transfer Action to the United States District
Court for the Central District of California [7].  On
December 20, 2016, the New Jersey Court granted
Defendants’ Motion to Transfer, denied the Motion to
Dismiss as moot, and transferred the Action to this
Court [31].
On May 19, 2017, Defendants filed the instant
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) (“FRCP” or “Rule”) [52].  Plaintiff
filed his Opposition on June 20, 2017 [81], and
Defendants’ Reply timely followed on July 3, 2017 [83].
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allow a
party to move for dismissal of one or more claims if
the pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  A complaint
must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
6
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true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Dismissal can be
based on a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the
absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable
legal theory.”  Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't,
901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 
In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may
generally consider only allegations contained in the
pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and
matters properly subject to judicial notice.  Swartz v.
KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007).  A court
must presume all factual allegations of the complaint
to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party.  Klarfeld v. United States,
944 F.2d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1991).  The question
presented by a motion to dismiss is not whether the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the
plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual grounds to
support a plausible claim to relief, thereby entitling
the plaintiff to offer evidence in support of its
claim.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002).  While a complaint need
not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff
must provide more than “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements.”  
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(internal citation omitted). 
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B. Analysis
1. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is
GRANTED in Part and DENIED in Part
A court “may judicially notice a fact that is not
subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is
generally known . . .; or (2) can be accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.”  Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).  A
court “must” take judicial notice “if a party requests
it and the court is supplied with the necessary
information.”  Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2).
Defendants seek judicial notice of the following
attached to the Kim Declaration: (1) the Complaint
filed in New Jersey state court; (2) a DVD copy of
Defendants’ movie Creed; (3) a DVD copy of Plaintiff’s
Pitch Reel; (4) screenshots of Dwayne Johnson and
Stallone’s Twitter accounts; (5) a transcript of the
December 20, 2016 Oral Opinion of the New Jersey
Court’s Magistrate Judge, Judge Michael A. Hammer,
granting Defendants’ Motion to Transfer; and (6)
September 24, 2015 and December 18, 2015 orders in Reed
v. National Football League, No. Civ. 15-1796 DMG
(AGRx), a Central District case granting defendants’
motions to dismiss.  Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Ntc. ¶¶
1-7, ECF No. 54; Decl. of Elaine Kim (“Kim Decl.”) Exs.
A-G, ECF Nos. 55, 55-1.
The Court GRANTS in Part Defendants’ Request for
Judicial Notice as to the first five items requested
8
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[54].  The Court takes judicial notice of the Complaint
and Judge Hammer’s Oral Opinion, as a court may take
judicial notice of previous filings in the same
litigation between the same parties.  See Shuttlesworth
v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 157 (1969).  The
Court also takes judicial notice of the Creed DVD, the
DVD containing the Pitch Reel, and the Twitter account
screenshots, as their contents are referred to
throughout the Complaint, and they can be accurately
and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.  Fed. R. Evid.
201(c)(2); Thomas v. Walt Disney Co., No. C-07-4392 CW,
2008 WL 425647, at *5 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2008). 
The Court DENIES in Part Defendants’ Request for
Judicial Notice as to the orders in Reed v. National
Football League.  While the Court can consider them as
persuasive authority, “to the extent [Defendants] seek
to cite that case in support of their arguments,
judicial notice is also unnecessary: the Court can, and
will consider the reasoning of that ruling for whatever
persuasive value it may have.”  Diversified Capital
Inv., Inc. v. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., No.
15-cv-03796-HSG, 2016 WL 2988864, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May
24, 2016). 
2. Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice is
GRANTED
Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of screenshots of
the Website, www.jarrettalexander.com, formerly known
9
Case 2:17-cv-03123-RSWL-KS   Document 85   Filed 08/14/17   Page 9 of 31   Page ID #:1117
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
as www.creedmovie.com.  Pl.’s Req. for Judicial Ntc.
Ex. A, ECF No. 82.  The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s
Request for Judicial Notice [82] because its contents
are referred to throughout the Complaint, and it can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.  Fed. R.
Evid. 201(c)(2); Thomas, 2008 WL 425647, at *5 n.1.
3. Defendants’ Motion is Procedurally Permitted
Plaintiff argues that the New Jersey Court’s denial
of Defendants’ previous Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
[6] bars the instant Rule 12(b)(6) Motion pursuant to
Rule 12(g).  Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
(“Opp’n”) 9:16-17.  Under Rule 12(g), “a party that
makes a motion under [Rule 12] must not make another
motion under this rule raising a defense or objection
that was available to the party but omitted from its
earlier motion.” 
Defendants can renew their Rule 12(b)(6) Motion. 
Arguments not raised in a previous motion to dismiss
are impermissible under Rule 12(g).  Sowinski v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-6431-SC, 2013 WL 2436229, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2013).  But the renewed Motion to
Dismiss repeats the same three arguments made in the
previous Motion to Dismiss: (1) Plaintiff did not keep
the Creed Idea confidential and widely disseminated it;
(2) the Copyright Act preempts his misappropriation of
idea and unjust enrichment claims; and (3) the breach
of implied contract claim lacks essential terms of
10
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price, duration, and lacks privity of contract. 
Compare Defs.’ First Mot. to Dismiss at 10, 14, 19, 23,
with Defs.’ Second Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”) at 4:12-19. 
Although the change in applicable substantive law from
New Jersey law to California law may slightly alter the
elements and tests applicable to the claims, it appears
that Defendants’ main, underlying contentions remain
the same.
Defendants can also renew their Motion because the
New Jersey Court transferred venue pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) and denied as moot Defendants’
previous Motion to Dismiss.  The New Jersey Court did
not expressly decide any of the arguments raised in
either Motion to Dismiss.  See Kim Decl. Ex. E; see,
e.g., NDX Advisors, Inc. v. Advisory Fin. Consultants,
Inc., No. C 11–3234 SBA, 2012 WL 6520689, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 13, 2012).
4. California Law Applies 
Before reaching the merits of the Motion to
Dismiss, the Court must decide whether California or
New Jersey state law apply to Plaintiff’s claims.
“Typically, a federal court sitting in diversity
applies the conflict-of-law rules of the state in which
it sits.  However, after a transfer under 28 U.S.C. §
1404, the choice-of-law rules of the transferor court
apply.”  Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 897 (9th
Cir. 2016)(internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).  Here, New Jersey’s choice-of-law rules apply
11
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to determine whether the Court should apply California
substantive law or New Jersey substantive law.
New Jersey uses the “governmental interest” test in
a choice-of-law analysis.  Erny v. Estate of Merola,
171 N.J. 86, 99 (2002).  “The determinative law is that
of the state with the greatest interest in governing
the particular issue.”  Velasquez v. Franz, 123 N.J.
498, 527 (1991)(citation omitted)(emphasis in
original).  The first prong asks “whether there is an
actual conflict between the laws of the states
involved.”  Erny, 171 N.J. at 100.  The second prong
asks the relative interest each state has in applying
its law.  Id. 
First, New Jersey and California law regarding
misappropriation of idea conflict because California
apparently does not recognize a misappropriation of
idea claim, see Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715 (1956),
but New Jersey law does.  Duffy v. Charles Schwab &
Co., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 802, 807-08 (D.N.J.
2000)(citing Flemming v. Ronson Corp., 107 N.J. Super
311, 317 (1969)). 
Assuming an inherent conflict between California
and New Jersey law, California has a greater interest
in adjudicating this Action.  For the second prong of
the governmental-interest test, New Jersey courts are
guided by these factors from Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971): “(1) the place where the
injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct
12
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causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and
place of business of the parties; and (4) the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.”3 
These factors counsel in favor of applying
California law.  As Judge Hammer noted in the New
Jersey Court’s Order Transferring Venue, Defendants’
awareness of the Creed Idea and how they
misappropriated it are key issues in this Action.  Kim
Decl. Ex. E, at 11:9-12.4  With those issues in mind,
California emerges as the state with a greater
interest.  The first factor favors New Jersey, as
Plaintiff’s injury took place there.  But this is only
because Plaintiff is domiciled in New Jersey.  Sarver,
813 F.3d at 898 (New Jersey was not necessarily the
3 New Jersey courts will also consider these factors from
the Restatement: “(1) the interests of interstate comity; (2) the
interests of the parties; (3) the interests underlying the field
of tort law; (4) the interests of judicial administration; and
(5) the competing interests of the states.”  Restatement (Second)
of conflict of Laws § 6 (1971).  To potentially deter California-
based entertainment corporations from misappropriating
individuals’ ideas, the Court concludes that these factors favor
applying California substantive law. 
4 Concluding that New Jersey has a stronger governmental
interest—and thus that New Jersey law applies—would be
inconsistent with the “law of the case;” that is, the New Jersey
Court’s venue analysis.  Judge Hammer cogently reasoned why the
Central District is an appropriate venue, and this analysis
guides the Court in the “governmental interest” choice-of-law
test.  Thus, Plaintiff’s efforts to argue that Judge Hammer’s
venue reasoning is inapplicable to the choice-of-law analysis are
unavailing.  Opp’n 11:4-16.
13
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location of plaintiff’s injuries just because he lived
there when defendants used his life story for a movie). 
Plaintiff supposedly created the Creed Idea in New
Jersey and developed it with his friend and consultant,
Mr. Malone, another New Jersey resident.  Opp’n 11:16-
21.  Beyond Plaintiff’s domicile and the domicile of an
ancillary non-party mentioned for the first time in the
Opposition, Plaintiff makes no effort to show how any
of the Restatement factors render New Jersey the state
with a greater interest in the Action.
The second and third factors weigh in favor of
California.  Not only do Defendants have their
principal places of business in California or are
domiciled here, but also the conduct causing the
alleged misappropriation of idea claim occurred here. 
Restatement § 145, cmt. e (1971)(in cases of unfair
competition or business or financial interests, “the
place of business is the more important contact”);
Sarver, 813 F.3d at 896.  Coogler apparently pitched
Creed to his agent and to Stallone’s agent in
California, and started developing the movie with MGM
in California.  Compl. ¶¶ 60-66.
The fourth factor is neutral.  It is unclear where
the locus of the parties’ relationship is because the
alleged contractual relationships arose from Twitter
interactions and the mailing of the Screenplay to
industry individuals.  Even so, it is not as though the
parties had meetings in New Jersey or that Defendants
14
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proceeded to exclusively market Creed there.  Stewart
v. World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc., No. 03 CV 2468
RLC, 2005 WL 66890, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2005)(the
parties’ relationship was centered in New York, because
“[m]any of the meetings between the two parties took
place in defendant’s New York offices, defendant
allegedly sold plaintiff’s lingerie concept in its New
York restaurant and defendant allegedly conducted
fashion shows in New York utilizing plaintiff's
ideas.”)  Accordingly, the Court applies California
substantive law to the Action. 
5. Motion to Dismiss
The Court now determines whether it should dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims for misappropriation of idea, breach
of implied contract, and unjust enrichment.
a. Misappropriation of Idea
To state a claim for California’s common-law
misappropriation tort, Plaintiff must plead that he
“has made a substantial investment of time, effort and
money in creating the thing misappropriated such that
the court can characterize the ‘thing’ as a kind of
property right; (2) the defendant has appropriated the
‘thing’ at little or no cost, such that the court can
characterize defendant’s actions as ‘reaping where it
has not sown;’ and (3) the defendant has injured
plaintiff by the misappropriation.”  Hollywood
Screentest of Am., Inc. v. NBC Univ., Inc., 151 Cal.
App. 4th 631, 650 (Ct. App. 2007)(citation omitted).
15
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A cursory glance at the Complaint reveals some of
these elements.  First, Plaintiff alleges that he
invested time and effort writing the Screenplay and
registering it with the Copyright Office and the WGA,
that he expended thousands of dollars on the Pitch
Reel, and that he built up the Website.  Compl. ¶¶ 26-
28, 30, 33, 39-40.  Second, Plaintiff’s allegations
suggest—albeit in a roundabout, circumstantial way—that
Defendants misappropriated the Creed Idea.  He strings
together the following allegations: he sent the
Screenplay to individuals in the movie industry with
whom Coogler has allegedly interacted; he tweeted
Stallone a link to the Website; and he tweeted the same
link to other individuals in the movie industry and
professional fighting industry that “follow” Stallone
on Twitter.  Id. at ¶¶ 36-37, 42-47.  Thus, Plaintiff
avers, Defendants saw the Screenplay, Pitch Reel, and
Website and misappropriated the Creed Idea.  Third, the
Complaint pleads the bare minimum regarding Plaintiff’s
injuries and damages: “Defendants’ wrongful
misappropriation . . . has caused [Plaintiff]
substantial harm, including, but not limited to, [his]
right to relevant portions of the substantial profits.” 
Id. at ¶ 91.
In spite of the minimally satisfactory allegations,
Plaintiff cannot get the first element—that the Creed
Idea is a property right—off the ground, as “[u]nder
California law . . . misappropriation . . . claims are
16
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actionable only to vindicate legally protected property
interests, and an idea is not recognized as a property
right.”  Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir.
1984)(citing Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 789
(1953)).  Put simply, “[a]n idea is usually not
regarded as property.”  Cal. Civ. Prac. Bus. Litig. §
68:2, (April 2017 update); see also Melchior v. New
Line Prods., Inc., 106 Cal. App. 4th 779, 793 (Ct. App.
2003)(no cause of action where plaintiff alleged
conversion of original idea for proposed television
series because “[t]he tort of conversion does not apply
to ideas”). 
In the seminal case, Desny, 46 Cal. 2d at 732, the
California Supreme Court expressed its wariness towards
misappropriation of idea claims.  In Desny, the
plaintiff submitted a movie proposal to Paramount
Pictures based on the true story of a boy who had been
trapped in a cave.  Id. at 726.  Paramount then made a
movie based on the same events.  Id.  In its discussion
of the “law pertaining to ideas,” the court stated that
“an idea is usually not regarded as property” and “the
fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer
money and labor, and has a value for which others are
willing to pay, is not sufficient to ensure to it this
legal attribute of property.”  Id. at 731 (emphasis
added).  As much as Plaintiff alleges that he expended
money and labor on the Creed Idea, he cannot sidestep
the fact that the misappropriation of idea claim—in the
17
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context of a plaintiff sending the defendant a movie
idea or disseminating a movie idea—is typically
unworkable under California law.5  Keane v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 921, 938
(S.D. Tex. 2004), aff’d 129 F. App’x 874 (5th Cir.
2005)(noting that misappropriation of an idea is not
explicitly recognized under Texas law).   
Although Keane applied Texas law to a
misappropriation of idea claim, it guides the Court’s
analysis here because the court in Keane recognized
that misappropriation of an idea, unlike
misappropriation of a product or trade secret, was
unavailable under Texas law.  297 F. Supp. 2d at 938. 
Assuming for purposes of the motion to dismiss that
misappropriation of idea was available, the court
decided whether defendants misappropriated plaintiff’s
idea for a television talent show, “American Idol.” 
Id. at 926.  The plaintiff sent a descriptive sales
packet to various financial investors and production
companies.  Because the allegations showed that he did
not “convey a protected idea in confidence,” instead
5 Because Plaintiff avers that New Jersey law applies, he
does not address Desny and instead sets his sights on New Jersey
misappropriation of idea claims.  Perhaps most telling is that
Plaintiff opts not to argue even in the alternative the
misappropriation of idea claim’s success under California law,
and does not provide a California case denying a motion to
dismiss a factually similar misappropriation of idea claim.  But
even the success of a misappropriation of idea claim under New
Jersey law is suspect, as the requisite “confidentiality of the
idea” element collapses in light of Plaintiff’s widespread
Internet dissemination of the Creed Idea.
18
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“gratuitously publish[ing]” his sales packet,
plaintiff, like the Desny plaintiff, could not claim
misappropriation of ideas “as free as the air.”  Id. at
941, 943; Desny, 46 Cal. 2d at 731.  Here, even if the
Court recognized Plaintiff’s misappropriation of idea
claim, it would lack the requisite confidentiality
because, like the Keane plaintiff, Plaintiff
disseminated and made the Creed Idea widely available.
Recognizing that misappropriation of an idea is a
slippery concept, California law allows contract
recovery—either breach of express contract or implied
contract—for plaintiffs claiming that their idea was
stolen.  See, e.g., Whitfield, 751 F.2d at 92 (although
misappropriation of an idea was unavailable as a stand-
alone claim, plaintiff could “recover[] for the
appropriation of an idea . . . on a contractual
theory”); Quirk v. Sony Pics. Entm’t Inc., No. C11-3773
RS, 2012 WL 12920192, at *n.3 (N.D. Cal. July 5,
2012)(“A viable implied contract claim, however, would
potentially render defendants liable for use of basic
ideas that are not protected under copyright, even if
nothing in the movie constitutes misappropriation of
expression”); cf. Interserve, Inc. v. Fusion Garage
PTE. LTD, No. C 09–5812 RS (PVT), 2010 WL 3339520, at
*8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010)(dismissing
misappropriation of “business” idea claim without leave
to amend as the tort claim sounded more in contract).
Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to
19
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Dismiss as to the misappropriation of idea claim and
determines if Plaintiff’s breach of implied contract
claim fares any better.6
b. Breach of Implied Contract
“California law recognizes that an implied-in-fact
contract arises when the writer submits material to a
producer with the understanding that the writer expects
to be paid if the producer uses his concept.”  Counts
v. Meriwether, 2:14-cv-00396-SVW-CW, 2015 WL 12656945,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2015)(citing Desny, 46 Cal.
2d at 715).  As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, the
so-called Desny claim protects individuals “who wish to
find an outlet for creative concepts and ideas.” 
6 While the misappropriation of idea claim is already
questionable under California law and should be dismissed on
subpar allegations alone, the fact that the Copyright Act may
preempt this claims counsels in favor of granting this Motion. 
“A plaintiff’s state-law cause of action is preempted under 17
U.S.C. § 301(a) if: (1) the work involved falls within the
general subject matter of the Copyright Act as specified by
sections 102 and 103; and (2) the rights that the plaintiff
asserts under state law are equivalent to those protected by the
Act in section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression.”  Firoozye v. Earthlink Network,
153 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1123–24 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  
Even though the Copyright Act does not protect ideas, the
Creed Idea was fixed in these tangible mediums and thus is within
the Copyright Act’s subject matter.  Mot. 17:16-18; Montz v.
Pilgrim Films & TV, Inc., 649 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2011). 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “used the Creed Idea in
writing, developing, producing, selling, and distributing their
Creed movie without [Plaintiff’s] express or implied permission
or authorization.”  Compl. ¶ 89.  From his allegations, Plaintiff
does not clearly seek protection for rights different from the
Copyright Act’s exclusive rights to reproduce, perform, or
distribute a work.  Celebrity Chefs Tour, LLC v. Macy’s, Inc., 16
F. Supp. 3d 1141, 1156-57 (S.D. Cal. 2014).  
20
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Montz, 649 F.3d at 981.
“To establish a Desny claim for breach of
implied-in-fact contract, the plaintiff must show that
the plaintiff prepared the work, disclosed the work to
the offeree for sale, and did so under circumstances
from which it could be concluded that the offeree
voluntarily accepted the disclosure knowing the
conditions on which it was tendered and the reasonable
value of the work.”  Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383
F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2004)(citing Faris v. Enberg,
97 Cal. App. 3d 309 (Ct. App. 1979)).
Plaintiff alleges that he prepared the Creed Idea
between 2008 and 2011, creating the Screenplay, Pitch
Reel, and Creed Website.  Compl. ¶¶ 25-41.  He
disclosed the Creed Idea at least to Stallone, by
tweeting him a link to the Website, and by distributing
the Screenplay to individuals who apparently know and
work with Coogler.  Plaintiff claims that the remaining
Defendants “reviewed” the Creed Idea, but alleges no
facts to support this allegation.7 
But Plaintiff has no allegations that the Creed
Idea was offered for sale.  “The law will not imply a
promise to pay for an idea from the mere facts that the
7 That Plaintiff also disseminated the Creed Idea to Carl
Weathers, the actor who played Apollo Creed in Rocky and to
Dwayne Johnson, a fighting industry professional, is of no moment
to the breach of implied contract claim, as these individuals are
not parties to the case or, apparently, the contract.  Id. at ¶¶
44, 47.
21
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idea has been conveyed, is valuable, and has been used
for profit . . . [plaintiff] must fail unless . . . he
can establish a contract to pay.”  Desny, 46 Cal. 2d at
739; see also Wilder v. CBS Corp., No. 2:12-cv-8961-SV
W-RZ, 2016 WL 693070, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2016)
(plaintiff told defendants during a pitch meeting that
she wanted payment for her proposed talk-show idea). 
Indeed, the allegations portray that Plaintiff offered
the Creed Idea gratuitously—asking Stallone, through
his Twitter account, “@TheSlyStallone next rocky
installment4u? 2min trailer. Wants to meet u
creedmovie.com.”  Compl. ¶ 46.   
Plaintiff argues that he understood, based on
industry custom, that he would be compensated for the
Creed Idea.  Id. at ¶ 88.  He adds that industry custom
dictates that writers will submit ideas to producers
and industry insiders with the expectation of
compensation, and that Defendants implicitly understood
this norm was in play here.  Id. at ¶¶ 52, 84-85. 
While industry custom may inform the implied contract
calculus, “reasonable expectation of payment . . .
[should] be inferred from the facts and circumstances.” 
Minniear v. Tors, 266 Cal. App. 2d 495, 502 (Ct. App.
1968). 
The facts and circumstances do not show Plaintiff
was to receive compensation.  Plaintiff’s allegations
make two tenuous inferences: (1) that he expected
payment for tweeting his Creed Idea to Stallone’s
22
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Twitter account (Stallone has over 1.7 million
followers), to which no response was received; (2) or
that he expected compensation after plastering his
Creed Idea all over the Internet.  Kim Decl. Ex. E, at
26.  Indeed, Plaintiff invites the Court to premise a
claim for breach of implied contract on a “tweet” that
was never responded to.  Jordan-Benel v. Univ. City
Studios, Inc., CV 14-5577-MWF(MRWx), 2015 WL 9694896,
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2015)(“[T]here needs to be
more than a unilateral offer and [Plaintiff] only
offers arguments as to his intent, not [Defendants’]
understanding or conduct”).  While requiring an in-
person meeting for a misappropriation of idea claim in
the world of movie and television pitching may be
unrealistic in light of communication and social media
advancements, Plaintiff’s theory of implied contract by
tweet and by mass-mailing of his Screenplay might turn
mere idea submission into a free-for-all. 
Plaintiff’s breach of implied contract claim also
fails to show that “[D]efendants voluntarily accepted
the disclosure knowing the conditions on which it was
tendered and the reasonable value of the work.” 
Grosso, 383 F.3d at 967.  Defendants argue that the
Complaint is devoid of this requisite privity between
the parties, and the Court agrees.  Mot. 19:18-19. 
Nowhere in his Complaint does Plaintiff indicate the
conditions on which he sent Defendants the Screenplay
or link to the Website.  Id.  Instead, Plaintiff
23
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alleges that he “intended to generate interest in [the
Creed Idea] so that it would be produced into a motion
picture with the expectation that [Plaintiff] would be
compensated for use of the [concept],” and he expected
that Defendants would just compensate him down the
road.  Compl. ¶ 51.  Plaintiff does not allege any
exchange or dialogue with Defendants.  It strains
reason that Defendants “accepted” Plaintiff’s offer to
enter a contract or understood the conditions under
which he tendered the Creed Idea from a unilateral
tweet and from Plaintiff disseminating his Creed Idea
on the Internet.  Desny, 46 Cal. 2d at 738-39 (contract
liability cannot attach where defendant has not had an
opportunity to reject an idea before its disclosure). 
Even in cases where the plaintiff alleged a more
concrete exchange between the parties, courts have been
wary to let an implied contract claim proceed at the
motion to dismiss stage.  Reed v. Nat’l Football
League, CV 15–01796 DMG (AGRx), 2015 WL 13333481, at
*3-4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2015)(granting motion to
dismiss even where plaintiff sent defendants a
voicemail with his proposed idea for a television
series, defendants’ representative told him to forward
his proposal to another executive, and the NFL informed
plaintiff it would not accept his unsolicited
proposal).
Above all else, the concern outlined in Desny comes
to fruition here: “[t]he idea man who blurts out his
24
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idea without having first made his bargain has no one
but himself to blame for the loss of his bargaining
power. The law will not in any event, from demands
stated subsequent to the unconditioned disclosure of an
abstract idea, imply a promise to pay for the idea, for
its use, or for its previous disclosure.”  46 Cal. 2d
at 739.  The Court thus GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss as to the breach of implied contract claim. 
c. Unjust Enrichment
In cases where a plaintiff alleges a defendant
producer stole his movie or television idea, “[t]here
is no cause of action in California for unjust
enrichment[,] [and] [t]he phrase unjust enrichment does
not describe a theory of recovery, but . . . [rather]
the result of a failure to make restitution.” 
Melchior, 106 Cal. App. 4th at 793 (internal
alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted). 
However, quasi-contract may “prevent unjust enrichment
where recovery ‘is based upon a benefit accepted or
derived for which the law implies an obligation to
pay.’”  Jonathan Browning, Inc. v. Venetian Resort,
LLC, No. C 07-3983 JSW, 2007 WL 4532214, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 19, 2007)(citation omitted). 
Per California law, the elements of unjust
enrichment are: (1) receipt of a benefit; and (2)
unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of
another.  In re ConAgra Foods, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 2d
1090, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2012).  Plaintiff alleges that
25
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Defendants received a “substantial benefit” from using
the Creed Idea and that equity requires them to
compensate him.  Compl. ¶¶ 101-102. 
The unjust enrichment claim has the same flaws as
the breach of implied contract claim.  Plaintiff cannot
allege how Defendants benefitted from the Creed Idea,
as it is uncertain whether and how Defendants accepted
the Creed Idea and converted it to their own benefit
after Plaintiff sent a unilateral tweet, created the
Website, and indiscriminately mailed copies of the
Screenplay to random industry individuals.  Moreover,
it is unclear why they must compensate him, as
Plaintiff has not demonstrated factual circumstances
binding the parties or making it equitable to
compensate Plaintiff for gratuitously disseminating the
Creed Idea.  Jonathan Browning, 2007 WL 4532214, at *8
(dismissing unjust enrichment claim as duplicative of a
quasi-contract or breach of implied contract claim);
Hollywood Screentest, 151 Cal. App. 4th at 649-50
(breach of implied contract failed because plaintiff
could not show defendants actually used his ideas;
thus, the “related cause” of unjust enrichment also
failed).8  The Court thus GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to
8 The unjust enrichment claim also merits dismissal, as it
is preempted by the Copyright Act.  The unjust enrichment claim
is “grounded” in Defendants’ alleged incorporation of Plaintiff’s
Creed Idea into their movie.  Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87–0592
WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989). 
Moreover, “there is no ‘extra element’ such as fraud or palming
off to save the . . . unjust enrichment claims from preemption.” 
26
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Dismiss as to the unjust enrichment claim.
d. Leave to Amend
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) provide that
a party may amend their complaint once “as a matter of
course” before a responsive pleading is served.  Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a).  After that, the “party may amend the
party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires.”  Id.  “Rule 15's
policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be
applied with ‘extreme liberality.’”  United States v.
Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981)(internal
quotations and citation omitted).  But if in a motion
to dismiss any amendment to the pleadings would be
futile, leave to amend should not be granted.  Bush v.
Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 77 F. Supp. 3d
900, 906-07 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  
The Court has strong misgivings that Plaintiff can
overcome the evident lack of facts or circumstances
indicating that Defendants received and misappropriated
the Creed Idea or overcome the fact that the parties
apparently never had any bilateral exchange through
which an implied contract could be inferred.  Plaintiff
Id. at *5 (citation omitted).  Finally, “where the unjust
enrichment arises from defendants’ unauthorized use of a
copyrighted work, such an extra element does not qualitatively
change the rights at issue, the rights the plaintiff holds in the
copyrighted work, and does not avoid preemption.”  Zito v.
Steeplechase Films, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1027 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
27
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has only demonstrated that he sent one Defendant,
Stallone, a link to the Website and widely distributed
the Screenplay.  From this, he asks the Court to infer
that Defendants misappropriated his idea and that the
parties had an implied-in-fact contract.  Plaintiff
seems to argue that industry custom allows for a viable
breach of implied contract claim where any individual
creates an idea, publicizes it, and then expects
compensation from anyone offering even a remotely
similar idea.  This stretches “industry custom” to its
breaking point.  Reed, 2016 WL 13344625, at *3 (denying
leave to amend breach of implied contract claim where
plaintiff only alleged that he sent defendants several
emails pitching his television program idea).
Affording Plaintiff the chance to amend his 
Complaint is likely to raise even more baseless
allegations, is unlikely to cure the current 
deficiencies, and is even more unlikely to render
Plaintiff’s Complaint “plausible on its face.”  ZL
Techs., Inc. v. Gardner, Inc., No. CV 09–02393 JF (RS),
2009 WL 3706821, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2009). 
Plaintiff lacks concrete allegations that show any
conversations he had with Defendants regarding
compensation and the conditions under which he shared
the Creed Idea.  The Court will not allow a breach of
implied contract claim to proceed on (1) tweets to a
popular celebrity social media account which were never
responded to; and (2) the fact that Defendants are
28
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generally in the same industry as unnamed individuals
to whom he sent the Screenplay.  
It would be conjectural for the Court to predicate
granting leave to amend on the possibility that
Plaintiff may have facts showing some kind of concrete
contract with Defendants where they agreed to use the
Creed Idea and set forth clear terms for compensation
and the conditions on which it would be used.  In
Montz, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s
decision to deny leave to amend the breach of implied
contract claim because the only cure would be
allegations that plaintiff authorized defendants to use
his work in exchange for payment, but plaintiff
insisted that defendants only used his ideas without
his express consent.  But leave to amend would be
inappropriate “where the allegation of other facts
consistent with the challenged pleading could not
possibly cure the deficiency.”  649 F.3d at n.3
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  It is
doubtful that Plaintiff could allege facts
substantiating that Defendants would compensate
Plaintiff, beyond his one-sided belief that they would
based on “industry custom.”  Here, guessing at
hypothetical facts that would plausibly cure the
claim’s defects is strained, as “Plaintiff has not
suggested that [he] can allege additional facts which
support [his] claim for relief.”  U.S. Care, Inc. v.
Pioneer Life Ins. Co. of Ill., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1057
29
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(C.D. Cal. 2002).  As such, the Court DENIES LEAVE TO
AMEND the breach of implied contract claim. 
The Court also DENIES LEAVE TO AMEND the
misappropriation of idea and unjust enrichment claims. 
California law does not recognize misappropriation of
idea and breach of implied contract is a more
appropriate vehicle for this type of claim.  Moreover,
it is not clear why Plaintiff does not raise a
copyright infringement claim, as he copyrighted the
Screenplay.  Plaintiff insists that he is not claiming
Defendants copied his Screenplay or his Pitch Reel. 
Opp’n 20:5-6.  While the Court will not speculate as to
the strength of a hypothetical copyright infringement
claim, the decision not to bring the claim in light of
the copyrighted Screenplay gives the Court pause as to
whether Defendants’ Creed truly misappropriates the
Creed Idea.  And “the Court can discern no way in which
additional factual allegations could cure the
deficiencies” in the unjust enrichment claim, id. at
*n.7, as it is likely preempted by the Copyright Act.
///
///
///
///
///
///
/// 
///
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III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [52] WITHOUT LEAVE TO
AMEND.  The Clerk shall close the case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.  
DATED: August 14, 2017      s/ RONALD S.W. LEW        
   HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW   Senior U.S. District Judge
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